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ARTICLES
Two Cheers For Employment-Based Health Insurance
David A. Hyman, M.D., J.D.* and Mark Hall, J.D.t'
Reform, sir, reform? Don't talk to me of reform. Things are bad enough as
they are.
-Sir Henry Maudsley'
Employment-based health insurance is the Rodney Dangerfield of
health policy: it gets no respect from anyone. Liberal enthusiasts of a one-
payor system view the existence of employment-based health insurance as a
major impediment to the achievement of universal comprehensive
coverage. From the opposite end of the political spectrum, free market
enthusiasts attack employment-based health insurance on the grounds that
individual preferences are systematically ignored, and cost-quality trade-
offs are inappropriately constrained when employers select coverage for
employees. Advocates for a patient bill of rights complain that managed
care is favored by employers (not employees), and argue that employers
are motivated by profits, instead of the best interests of their employees.4
Prominent health policy scholars and the media routinely condemn the
linkage between employment and health insurance.5 Even employers, who
offer coverage as a way of attracting and retaining employees, are at best
lukewarm about their role in the coverage market.
6
Given these unfavorable attitudes, it is not particularly surprising that
reforming these arrangements has been a perennial topic on the policy
agenda--even though most employed individuals with health insurance
obtain their coverage through their employers, and the employment-based
market provides coverage for approximately 177 million Americans.7
During the past six decades, thousands of pieces of legislation have been
* David A. Hyman is a Professor at the University of Maryland School of Law.
t Mark Hall is a Professor of Law and Public Health at Wake Forest University.
I An early version of this Article was presented by Professor Hyman as testimony to the
Working Group on Challenges to the Employment-Based Health Care System, Advisory
Committee on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, Department of Labor. We
appreciate the helpful comments of Russell Korobkin, Peter Jacobson, and Tom Miller.
Norman Stein's gracious invitation to address the Working Group (on which he serves)
provided us with the opportunity to address these issues.
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introduced at the state and federal levels, seeking reforms ranging from
the incremental to the radical. Legislation has sought to change the tax
treatment of health insurance premiums, encourage more people to
purchase health insurance on their own, partially or completely eliminate
employers from the coverage market, mandate all employers to provide
coverage, require employers to include specified benefits or providers in
their coverage, and the like. Articles supporting and criticizing each of
these competing proposals and offering additional reforms fill the pages of
medical, legal, economic, and health policy journals.
This Article steps back from this morass of competing proposals and
considers the employment-based coverage market from a comparative
institutional perspective." This approach allows us to assess the costs and
benefits of the existing system against the likely alternatives, and provide a
more balanced foundation for assessing proposed reforms. As the title of
this Article suggests, we conclude that the employment-based coverage
market deserves "two cheers," and relatively modest incremental changes
are all that are required (or for that matter, politically likely, during the
foreseeable future) to ensure the continued smooth functioning of the
employment-based coverage market.9
Our assessment that the employment-based coverage market deserves
"two cheers" is unlikely to satisfy most commentators, irrespective of
whether they favor a one-payor system, universal adoption of medical
savings accounts, or something in between. The score we assign to
employment-based health insurance obviously falls well short of perfection.
Yet, it is important to keep in mind that perfection is never an appropriate
standard for judging real world policies and institutions."' Any "reform" of
the employment-based coverage market will replace the existing
institutional arrangements and problems with new (and not necessarily
improved) institutional arrangements and problems." Prudent policy-
making requires that one has a full appreciation of the advantages and
disadvantages of existing arrangements, and a framework for determining
whether proposed reforms, on balance, make things better or worse. 2 In
this Article, we seek to provide the information and analysis necessary to
accomplish both of these goals.
Part I explains how employers ended up occupying such a central role
in modern health policy and provides a snapshot of the current coverage
marketplace. Part II outlines a number of problems with the current
system. Part III provides a comparative institutional perspective on the
problems outlined in Part II. Part IV considers the politics of incremental
reform, offers a few modest "fixes" to the problems outlined in Part II, and
addresses the problem of the uninsured.
11:1 (2001)
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I. WHERE WE ARE, AND How WE GOT HERE
A. The Rise of Employment-Based Coverage
Employers were initially marginal players in the coverage market, but
they quickly assumed a dominant position. In large part, this outcome was
simply a historical accident, fueled by federal labor and tax policy. Before
World War II, some employers offered early forms of managed care to
their workers and families, but these employers were very much the
exception.1 3 The medical profession vehemently opposed such "contract"
or "corporate" practice, and sought to limit the spread of such
arrangements. 4 By one estimate, no more than four million Americans, or
approximately 3% of the population, had employment-based coverage in
1930."5
The first dramatic increase in employment-based coverage came
during World War II. Wage and price controls were instituted by the Office
of Price Administration in an attempt to deal with inflation.16 Employer
contributions to insurance and pension funds were not counted as wages,
and were accordingly excluded from the wage controls. The freezing of
cash wages forced employers to compete for scarce labor by enhancing
their fringe benefit packages. Health insurance offered a straightforward
way for employers to sweeten their compensation package in a manner
that would be quite appealing to potential employees.
The second impetus for employment-based coverage was the federal
tax code. In 1943, the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling indicating
that the amounts paid by employers for insurance for employees did not
constitute income to employees, even though employers could deduct
these amounts as ordinary and necessary business expenses.17 Ten years
later, the IRS withdrew this ruling, but Congress amended the Internal
Revenue Code in 1954 to expressly exclude employment-based coverage
from taxable income. 8 In effect, this asymmetric tax treatment allows
employers to purchase health insurance for their employees using
employees' before-tax income, rather than forcing employees to purchase
it themselves with after-tax income. The amount of the subsidy is a
function of the marginal tax rate for any given taxpayer, but its size is
larger for higher-income taxpayers because of the progressivity of federal
taxation.1 9 In the aggregate, this subsidy is worth more than $100 billion in
foregone tax revenue per year, and is the second largest tax expenditure,
after home mortgage interest.20 The result is a substantial financial
incentive for employees to obtain coverage through their employer if at all
possible.2
Labor unions were another factor in the rise of employment-based
3
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coverage. During the late 1940s and 1950s, unions aggressively bargained
for richer benefit packages, with health insurance at the top of their list.
2
In industries in which unions were strong (e.g., manufacturing and public-
sector employment), the result was that many subscribers obtained first-
dollar insurance coverage and medical care at no out-of-pocket cost to
themselves whatsoever.2' Employers with non-unionized workforces also
offered rich benefits to discourage their employees from unionizing.
24
B. A Snapshot of the Employment-Based Coverage Market
Although the figures have fluctuated somewhat in the past decade,
employment-based coverage seems to have stabilized at approximately 65%
of the under-65 population, or roughly 177 million Americans. 5 Most
employees of large and medium-sized corporations now have access to
employment-based coverage, although not all of them choose to take
advantage of it.2 6 Employment-based coverage is much less available to
those who work in certain industries (e.g., agriculture, retail, and food
service), temporary and part-time employees, and those who work for small
businesses. Dependents of employees can usually obtain coverage
through the working member of the family, but increased cost sharing has
caused some erosion of such coverage in recent years. The result of these
patterns is that approximately thirty-nine million Americans are uninsured
in any given year-even though about 85% of the uninsured live in
families headed by an individual who works at some time during the year.
More than 50% of the uninsured are full-time, full-year workers, or their
family members. The remaining sixty-five million Americans are covered
by Medicare, Medicaid, or another governmental program, and thus do
not require employment-based coverage.28
Commentators wax poetic about the social role of health insurance,
and treat the decision to offer and purchase such coverage in morally
weighted terms.29 However, the evidence is fairly clear that potential
subscribers approach coverage decisions in traditional economic terms.
When faced with a choice of health care coverage, price is the key driver of
the decision-making process, and a significant number of individuals who
have access to coverage through their employer decline it on the grounds
30it is too expensive.
II. PROBLEMS WITH AN EMPLOYMENT-BASED SYSTEM
Most of the difficulties with employment-based insurance stem from
the fact that someone other than the ultimate consumer of health care is
making most of the decisions about what coverage to purchase and how
11:l1(2001)
4
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 2 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol2/iss1/2
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE
much to pay.3' By selecting particular insurance products to offer their
employees, and excluding others, employers necessarily influence what
services are covered, and the circumstances under which those services can
be delivered. In like fashion, by selecting particular insurance products,
employers effectively dictate the scope and nature of the cost-quality-access
trade-offs their employees can make.3 ' Although some employers offer
their employees multiple health insurance arrangements, approximately
half of employed workers are not offered such a choice.3 Even when
multiple plans are offered, there is little ability to tailor coverage to
particular needs and tastes.34 The net result is a series of informational,
preference, and incentive mismatches-between employers and
employees, and between employee groups and individual employees-that
play out in the cost and breadth of the coverage that is offered.
A. Heterogeneous Preferences
Because employee preferences with regard to cost, quality, and access
are heterogeneous, and employer information as to employee preferences
and health care quality is imperfect, the result is that there are predictable
disjunctions between the coverage preferences of any given employee and
the terms selected by the employer on behalf of the employment-based risk
pool as a whole. 5 For example, some employees might prefer that their
insurance cover more extensive postpartum hospitalization, while others
might prefer better coverage of AIDS, and some employees might simply
prefer less generous coverage in exchange for a higher take-home salary.
The distribution of these preferences will also vary from employer to
employer; the employees of a start-up software company in Silicon Valley
are likely to want a quite different package of benefits than the employees
at an automobile assembly plant in Detroit.36 Whatever the choice, the
specification of coverage necessarily implies a series of trade-offs within the
risk pool, with significant distributional implications within and across
identifiable groups.
B. Incentive Mismatches
Even when there is uniformity of preferences within employee ranks,
there are incentive mismatches between employers and employees. An
employer may care greatly about conditions that affect its most highly
valued employees, but show less consideration for conditions that
disproportionately affect employees who are fungible, or work in a division
slated for sale or closure. Incentive mismatches also affect issues of quality.
Because employers internalize only a portion of the benefits of better
5
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quality care, they have less incentive to favor any particular quality
enhancement than do employees as a group."
Stated more concretely, because plans are a "bundled" product aimed
at a diverse workforce, the alternatives that any given employer offers
frequently do not include desired and desirable features from the
perspective of any given employee, while also including features an
individual employee may regard as a waste of money.38 Changes in
coverage also induce disruption and dislocation costs, whose magnitude is
greatest for those with chronic conditions requiring highly specialized
care.3 9 It is commonplace (and completely accurate) to describe these
mismatches as a source of market failure in the coverage and delivery
markets.
C. Information Imperfections
Additional difficulties are created by the lack of transparency of the
employment-based coverage system. Employer contributions are just
another form of compensation to employees-and increased costs of
coverage result in smaller wages for employees. 40 However most employees
(and some employers) believe that employers are footing the bill for the
coverage that employees receive. The result is that employees are relatively
indifferent to the cost of their health care coverage (at least to the extent
their employer is the one writing the check), while employers are
extremely concerned about the cost of providing coverage for their
employees. This lack of transparency creates a set-up for conflict between
employers and employees about the nature and cost of coverage. Indeed,
the lack of transparency probably accounted for much of the backlash
against managed care, as employees did not perceive that they had
received any benefit from the change, even though they received most of
41the estimated "savings" of $300 billion in the form of higher wages.
D. Labor Market Dislocations
The linkage of employment and health coverage also creates
sequencing difficulties when one changes jobs, or loses ajob. Many health
insurance policies contain waiting periods or exclusions on pre-existing
conditions, which chill job mobility ('Job-lock") . A worker might also
choose to stay in his current job if the substantive terms of insurance
coverage are particularly valuable to the worker or his family, even though
another job might offer greater opportunities or a higher salary.4 3
Similarly, because coverage is linked to employment, individuals who lose
their jobs simultaneously lose their health insurance coverage." Congress
11:1 (2001)
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was sufficiently concerned about these problems that it sought to enhance
continuity and portability legislatively.
4
When employers do not offer coverage at all, employees are unable to
purchase such coverage on tax-advantaged terms, no matter how much
they might desire it. Temporary and part-time workers also have difficulty
obtaining coverage because of their transitory connection to any given
employer. When these factors are combined with the substantial
geographic variation in the distribution and type of employers, the result is
that some states have substantially higher rates of uninsurance, simply
because of employment demographics in that state."
E. Regulatory Dislocations
Finally, all of these problems are worsened by the haphazard manner
in which federal law preempts the traditional forms of regulatory oversight
that would apply were the coverage not employment-based. In brief, state
insurance commissioners have traditionally regulated the terms of
insurance contracts quite aggressively, and state courts routinely employed
common law causes of action to encourage insurers to deliver what they
promise.4 ' However, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) creates a large loophole in this structure by preempting most
state-level regulation of health insurance if it is provided in connection
with employment,48 and by providing only an exceedingly limited set of
remedies (lawsuits are, to a first approximation, limited to the value of the
denied services). This approach makes sense for protecting pension funds,
which was ERISA's primary focus. Health benefits were included in ERISA
as an afterthought, with little consideration given to whether the same
regulatory framework would work-a problem that became increasingly
obvious as managed care came to dominate the coverage market.
The result of this statutory framework is to leave employment-based
health insurance effectively unregulated, since ERISA contains no
substantive regulation of health benefits. ERISA does provide that the state
can indirectly regulate an employee benefit plan if the plan purchases
insurance from a state-regulated insurer (an "insured" employee benefit
plan). However, only limited forms of regulation are allowed, and many
potential tort claims are still preempted. Moreover, if the employer
provides its own insurance (a "self-funded" employee benefit plan), the
plan is effectively not subject to any state regulation. Thus, so long as
coverage is employment-based, ERISA makes it extremely difficult to
employ the traditional mechanisms for ensuring accountability-a fact that
has helped fuel the drive for a patient bill of rights.49
This litany of problems makes it clear why reform of these
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arrangements is a popular topic. Yet, initiating such reforms solely on the
basis of complaints about the status quo is akin to convicting a defendant
after hearing only from the prosecution. 50 It is one thing to identify
shortcomings in employment-based coverage, and quite another to draw
the conclusion that any given reform is necessary and appropriate-
irrespective of whether the reform is aggressive state and federal
regulation, elimination of ERISA preemption, replacing employment-
based coverage with a one-payor system, medical savings accounts, or an
individual mandate. Instead, a comparative institutional perspective
requires that we consider whether employment-based coverage, for all its
imperfections, outperforms alternative institutional arrangements. As
Professor Neil Komesar concisely noted, "bad is often best, because it is
better than the existing alternatives." 51
III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Advantages of an Employment-Based System
Viewed from a comparative institutional perspective, employers
perform several important and under-appreciated functions for employees
in the coverage and delivery markets. First, the agency problems noted
above often are more theoretical than real. Although the involvement of
employers in the coverage market was effectively accidental, they are
actually fairly well suited for the position they find themselves in. Surveys
and focus groups indicate that employers do a reasonably good job
reflecting their workers' values and preferences, just as one would expect
in a reasonably competitive labor market.
5 2
Employment-based coverage also helps to solve other types of market
imperfections. In particular, employers provide useful search and
aggregation functions for their employees in connection with the
specification of coverage terms. This process of "informational
intermediation" helps compensate for the bounded rationality of
individual employees, and ensures that coverage will not be limited to
conditions that are salient to employees at the time of purchase. Medium
and large employers also have personnel departments, which can cost-
effectively handle coverage design, enrollment, premium collection, and
dispute resolution. Many employers have developed as much sophistication
and expertise in health insurance as that of most insurers. The result is
that employers can bargain aggressively for discounts, serve as an effective
advocate for employees who are involved in coverage disputes, and obtain
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Employers also improve market conditions without even trying. Since
employers are offering group coverage, they create significant efficiencies
of scale with regard to administrative and marketing costs. This advantage
is reflected in the portion of the insurance premium devoted to paying
medical costs, rather than going to administrative overhead. Overhead
costs for the largest employer groups are typically 5% or less, whereas these
costs reach around 20% for smaller groups, and go above 30% for
individual purchasers. Savings of this magnitude allow the purchase of
more extensive coverage than otherwise would occur.
Employment-based insurance also promotes more comprehensive
coverage by virtue of the substantial tax subsidy associated with such
insurance. 56 Insurance pools naturally tend to suffer from lack of cohesion
and stability. It is not a simple matter to form a group that is willing to pool
their health insurance expenses and arrange for (and selectively subsidize)
insurance, such that almost everyone in the group will opt into coverage. If
members of the group have widely varying risk profiles and can obtain
comparable coverage outside the group setting, the healthier ones will opt
out and purchase individually at a rate cheaper than the average cost for
the entire group. In other words, the savings to healthier members from
disaggregating the group could well exceed the savings from group
economies. In these circumstances, only the tax subsidy makes it
significantly more attractive to purchase coverage through one's employer.
Therefore, the tax subsidy plays the important role of keeping intact the
heterogeneous risk pools that are needed to achieve the administrative
efficiencies found in employment-based health insurance.
Healthier members opting out of a group is one form of a more
general phenomenon known as "adverse selection." This phenomenon is
pervasive in insurance and can cause insurance to become partially or
entirely unmarketable. Adverse selection occurs when potential subscribers
know more about their individual risks than the insurer knows.57 Suppose,
for instance, that a health insurer approaches a market assuming that all
people of the same age and sex have the same risk of disease or injury and
so the insurer prices its product accordingly-say, at $3,000 for males aged
40 to 45. Naturally, not all men this age have the same risk of illness. Some
are in excellent shape, some have average health, and some are already
sick. If the insurer is not able to act on this information (or is prohibited
from learning it), and if only some people purchase insurance, a
disproportionate number of sicker people will subscribe, because those
with greater than average risk will find the average price more attractive
than those of lesser risk. A pool of sicker-than-average subscribers will
obviously end up costing more than $3,000 per person, so an insurer that
9
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wants to remain solvent will raise its price-say to $3,500. This does not
solve the adverse selection problem, since at any price the insurance is by
definition more attractive to higher-risk than to lower-risk subscribers.
Adverse selection exists as an imperfection to some degree in all
insurance markets, and it is increased by laws (such as community rating)
that require insurers to disregard certain risk factors. Adverse selection
discourages the purchase of insurance by some people who would
otherwise have chosen to purchase coverage. At the extreme, adverse
selection may destroy the market altogether, since the tendency is for
prices to migrate towards those that are appropriately charged for the
highest risks. Obviously, this price point is unaffordable for many-and a
bad deal for most-potential subscribers. One remedy for adverse
selection is for insurers to engage in risk underwriting, by learning as
much as possible about the risks of individual subscribers and to group and
price subscribers according to their actual risks. This process is referred to
as risk selection (or risk assessment) and risk rating. The effect is to create
multiple, separately priced risk pools that are each stable. In individual
health insurance, risk selection is done through questionnaires and
medical exams. Ferreting out more refined risk information can be costly.
Moreover, this process results in higher-risk people being priced out of the
market, and in types of coverage that are more attractive to higher-risk
people not being offered at all.
Employment-based coverage offers a partial solution to these
problems. Because an employment-based risk pool exists for reasons
independent of the demand for coverage, the significance of adverse
selection in the coverage market is greatly attenuated. Employers, except
for the very smallest "mom-and-pop shops," are not motivated to purchase
insurance by specific anticipated health care needs (such as an anticipated
pregnancy). Therefore, the insurer can safely assume that the group's
future medical expenses will approximate the group's recent experience.
This allows the insurer to assess the overall group's average risk simply by
observing its claims experience (experience rating), rather than assessing
each individual member's risk. More importantly, because the group exists
for non-insurance reasons, new members of the group will not be higher-
than-average risk and group-leavers will not be lower-than-average risk. In
other words, group members will not select in or select out of the group
just because of the insurance, so the group's risk will remain stable. In
combination, this means that coverage can be written in the employment-
based market at a considerably lower cost than would be the case if each
member of the pool presented individually and requested coverage.
Employment-based groups are also cost-effective vehicles for
11: 1 (200 1)
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insurance, because workers (and, to a lesser extent, their beneficiaries) are
healthier on average than non-workers. This demographic reality lowers
the cost of coverage still further. As a consequence of these economic
advantages, insurance purchased by employees through large employers
costs about one-third less than equivalent coverage would cost in the
individual insurance market, if it were available-and equivalent coverage
is often not available at all. 8
Employment-based coverage is also the nexus for cross-subsidization
within pre-existing risk groups. Because employment-based coverage is not
risk-adjusted or underwritten within the risk pool, there are, by definition,
systematic cross-subsidies flowing within the pool. 5' Although these
arrangements fall well below the degree of social solidarity desired by
advocates of one-payor systems, they are real, and long-standing.60 The
success of employment-based coverage in maintaining these internal cross-
subsidies should be contrasted with the difficulty that states and the federal
government have encountered in mandating or maintaining such cross-
subsidization. 6
As private actors, employers also have greater flexibility in the design
and implementation of cost-cutting and quality-enhancing initiatives than
public payors. Public payor initiatives typically trigger opposition and
lobbying; private payor initiatives are (relatively) insulated from such
processes.2 In like fashion, public payors are subject to constitutional and
statutory norms of uniformity and openness, while private payors have
greater freedom to provide different benefits to different customers and to
define their obligations and methods of dispute resolution by contract.
63
Employment-based coverage also neatly maps onto traditional
American attitudes regarding government.64 The large public programs
(Medicare and Medicaid) are reserved for those who are too poor or high-
risk to have market options.' When responsibility for coverage is handled
by private parties, the government's access to sensitive information on its
citizens is sharply constrained. Employees are less than thrilled that their
employers have access to this information, but they are even less
enthusiastic about the government having the information. Similarly, when
employers are responsible for making coverage arrangements, the
government has considerably more limited involvement than would
otherwise be the case-a feature that is particularly desirable if one doubts
66the competence and compassion of a governmental bureaucracy.
Finally, employment-based coverage may allow for more innovation
with regard to coverage arrangements. Although Medicare was responsible
for a number of significant innovations in payment patterns (e.g.,
prospective payment via diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and the
11
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resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS)), such arrangements tend to
be all-or-nothing developments. Because of the large number of
employers, coverage innovations can develop in a bottom-up fashion. For
example, a number of employers are flirting with moving from "defined
benefit" coverage (in which the employer picks one or more coverage
options for all of its employees) to a "defined contribution" arrangement
(in which employees receive a specified amount to be used for the
purchase of whatever coverage they desire).67 These proposals coincide
with the emergence of web-based systems that individuals can use to shop
for such coverage. Although such arrangements create problems of risk
adjustment, they hold out the potential of eliminating many of the
previously outlined agency problems associated with the involvement of
employers in the coverage market.
An even more intriguing development is the interest of some
employers in using their market power to force providers to improve the
quality of care they are providing. Historically, individual patients have
paid little attention to the problem of low quality care, since they tend to
rate the quality of care they personally receive quite highly.69 Such
confidence is unwarranted; the quality of American medicine varies widely.
Some services are over-utilized, others are under-utilized, and utilization
rates vary from place to place in unexplained ways.7" Patients are also
frequently injured as a result of medical treatment. The Institute of
Medicine estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths per year result
from medical mistakes-making medical error the eighth leading cause of
death in the United States. 7' Every year, medical errors kill more people
than motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS.1
2
Although these problems are generally not salient to individual
recipients of health care, employers have started to address them.73
Predictably enough, they are using economic incentives to encourage
providers to ensure the quality of care they provide, instead of paying
providers based on variables that bear little or no relationship to the
quality of care that is rendered (e.g., the amount of time a provider spends
with a patient, the number of patients a provider treats, the number and
type of procedures a provider performs, the number of weeks a provider is
employed, or the number of patients in a provider's practice) 7' The
acknowledged leader in this campaign to develop "value-based purchasing"
is the Pacific Business Group on Health (PBGH), a consortium of
employers who collectively spend more than $3 billion annually on health
care for nearly three million employees. In 1995, PBGH began negotiating
performance contracts with the HMOs with whom they dealt. HMOs that
failed to meet targets on a variety of performance measures were required
11:l1 (200 1)
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to forfeit a small portion of their fees. 5 Once performance was tied to
compensation, the quality of care that was rendered started to improve.
76
PBGH's success has led other groups to copy its strategy."
Employers are also taking steps to address the problem of medical
errors. The Leapfrog Group, a consortium of employers, has pledged that
its members will purchase health care services only from providers who
have made certain specified investments in error reduction. Hospitals must
adopt computerized systems for prescribing medicines, patients requiring
particularly complex procedures must be referred to hospitals with the
highest survival rates, and hospitals with intensive care units must provide
twenty-four hour staffing by critical care physicians.8 Each of these
initiatives has been demonstrated to improve patient outcomes, and there
appear to be substantial financial savings associated with implementing
them. Indeed, Leapfrog Group estimates indicate that these three
improvements could save up to 58,300 lives per year and prevent 522,000
medication errors, if implemented by all non-rural hospitals in the United
States.
79
To be sure, these initiatives are small steps by only a few employers.0
However, even these baby steps are more than any federal or state health
program has been able to do-or is likely to do, given the political
81dynamics under which these programs operate. When the New York
Department of Public Health suggested the use of performance-based
compensation for cardiac surgery, physicians and hospitals pressured
legislators to prohibit such arrangements. 2 Medicare has had limited
success with its attempts to designate "centers of excellence" for cardiac
and orthopedic surgery, as providers have claimed that the centers are
being selected primarily on grounds of cost, rather than quality.83
B. Problems with Reforms
Although the employment-based coverage market has all of the
weaknesses outlined previously, a fair comparison requires one to consider
the analogous weaknesses of any proffered "reform." It is easier to identify
agency conflicts and bounded rationality than it is to solve such problems.
Any system of preference aggregation invariably creates a problem with
preference mismatch-and the larger the group being aggregated the
worse the problem. Any given "reform" will not solve all of the problems
found in the employment-based market, and it may well make some of
them worse-particularly when one factors in the likelihood of legislation
by anecdote, symbolic blackmail, and agency capture.
Enthusiasm is not a sufficient precondition to ensure that "reforms"
improve on the status quo. The critical institutional competence question
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is whether those who will be designing and running the system after the
"reform" has been implemented have the necessary information,
preferences, and incentives to outperform the employment-based market.
In economic terms, the issue is which agency relationship is less imperfect
across the relevant dimensions of cost, quality, and access. In reality, most
of the "reforms" suffer from the same weaknesses as the employment-based
coverage system-and when a "reform" performs better on one aspect of
the incentives/information/preferences mismatch triad, it usually does
worse on another aspect of the triad. Alternatively, the "reforms" may
trigger adaptive responses that are socially inefficient, and make everyone
worse off. Thus, it is far from clear that any of the reforms will actually
improve the status quo-particularly if the reforms are not subject to the
market test of allowing affected individuals to determine whether they
prefer the status quo ante.
For example, if employment-based health insurance is abandoned,
adverse selection will become a much more serious problem. Risk selection
(both favorable and unfavorable) is likely to require regulatory attention.
If each person is allowed to contract for the precise coverage he or she
anticipates needing, those seeking to purchase any given policy will
disproportionately be those expecting to make claims under the policy. As
costs for that particular policy rise to reflect claims experience, those who
do not value the specified coverage will make alternative arrangements-
triggering still-greater increases in premiums and more defections from
the risk pool. In short order, many forms of coverage will be unavailable at
any price.
The problems presented by risk selection are illustrated by the
difficulties potential subscribers currently encounter purchasing health
insurance in the individual market. A recent study approached nineteen
insurers in eight different states with a variety of hypothetical purchasers
who had common, but not terribly serious, health problems-for example,
a person with hay fever, a person with a bad knee from an old sports injury,
a child with asthma and ear infections, and an overweight smoker with
high blood pressure. The study found that 90% of the time, full coverage
was not available at standard rates. Either coverage was refused, premium
surcharges averaging 38% were imposed, or the condition in question was
excluded .
Employers represent an effective solution to the risk selection
collective action problem. If large numbers of people leave the employer
coverage market, legislators and regulators will need to address the issue-
most likely by reforming how insurance is sold in the individual market
and mandating a menu of benefits. Unfortunately, when legislatures
11:l1 (200 1)
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mandate benefits, they simply replace one set of preference aggregation
problems (at the employer level) with a worse set of preference
aggregation problems (because the process is conducted at the state or
federal levels), coupled with the distorting consequences of symbolic
blackmail and private self-interest on the substantive content of the
mandates.86 Other market reforms, such as guaranteed issue, open
enrollment, and versions of community rating essentially attempt to
replicate for the individual market the risk pooling and efficiencies that
currently exist in the employer market. However, the technical problems
in accomplishing this goal are much greater than the current models that
exist in the small group market.8 7 In the small-group market, employers'
role in forming insurance pools and selecting coverage helps to solve the
adverse selection problems created by restricting insurers' ability to
underwrite according to health risk. In the individual market, however,
adverse selection problems become insurmountable. States that have
required versions of open enrollment and community rating for non-
employer sponsored health insurance have seen insurance prices rise
steeply and rates of coverage drop significantly.
8
Many advocates of non-employer based insurance point to private
purchasing associations as the solution to the problems in the individual
market. They contend that a variety of different pools, resembling current
discounting arrangements for trade association and professional groups,
could, in competition with each other, replicate the role that employers
play in negotiating lower rates and achieving economies of scale. 9
Although there is force to these arguments, considerable technical
difficulties exist in determining how these hybrid entities would operate at
the border of the individual and group markets without disrupting either
market. Advocates argue that these association pools should be protected
from regulatory mandates that do not apply to large employers, and these
pools should be allowed to set their rates according to the group's overall
claims experience, as is done for large employers, in order to have an
incentive to lower costs and bargain for better rates. If this is done,
however, these private associations are likely to draw off the better risks
from the individual and small-group markets, possibly causing them to
collapse into high-risk pools. Also, different associations offering similar
coverage based on the risk profile of people who happen to belong to each
pool creates a turbulent market dynamic in which people continually shop
to join an association in which most people are healthier than they are.
Finally, initial experience with existing insurance cooperatives indicates
that they only marginally improve economies of scale. Transaction costs
remain high because each subscriber has to be dealt with individually,
15
Hyman and Hall: Two Cheers For Employment-Based Health Insurance
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
rather than a single purchaser acting on behalf of an entire group.90 In
short, voluntary pools contain only a shadow of the efficiencies created by
employment-based pools. At bottom, they lack both the cohesion and the
economies of scale in employment-based pools.
Even if the individual market can be successfully reformed, non-
employment-based coverage would create significant risk adjustment
problems. If insurance purchase is not mandated, healthier people will
drop coverage. Subsidies are required for those who cannot afford
coverage, but the subsidies must be risk adjusted to prevent insurer "red-
lining" of subscribers whose anticipated health costs exceed the allowable
premium. The science of risk adjustment is far from being perfect, despite
two decades of development-and its complexity is likely to rival that of
other administered pricing systems such as DRGs. 9'
A single-payor system addresses some of these problems (particularly
adverse selection), but it worsens others. In particular, the problem of
preference aggregation is substantially worsened when everyone in a state
(or in the nation) is included in a single risk pool covered by a single
benefits package-with the substantive content of that benefits package
greatly influenced by political lobbying, symbolic blackmail, and self-
interest.9" Single-payor systems are also uniquely vulnerable to larger
budgetary pressures, as the amounts available to pay for health care are
determined every year based on how effectively health care can compete
with other budgetary priorities. 93 Many Americans are also suspicious of the
public bureaucracy, which will be required to administer such programs.
Finally, once the government is a monopsony purchaser, it must navigate
the complexities of setting prices, picking qualified providers, and making
long-term capital investment decisions. Each of these decisions creates
major coordination problems that separately, and in combination, have
the potential to increase cost and undermine quality and access. More
generally, there are substantial hazards from both under-payment and
over-payment, and little probability of convergence toward the "right rate"
94
over time.
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
A. The Logic of Incremental Reform
There are serious collective action problems associated with building
the necessary support for enacting sweeping reforms. Machiavelli framed
the problem quite neatly:
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to
11:l1 (200 1)
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conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for
enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and
lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This
coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on
their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily
believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.
95
Given this dynamic, it is not at all surprising that periods of sweeping
reform (e.g., the New Deal and the Great Society) are relatively rare.
Institutional and political considerations also make it hard for anything but
incremental changes to emerge from the legislative process-and
implementation raises additional barriers.96 The repeated failure of
attempts to create a national health care system testify to the difficulties
that confront aspiring reformers. In health care, there are too many
competing vested interests, and too few people who are fundamentally
dissatisfied with their coverage, for comprehensive reform to be politically
viable under ordinary circumstances. 9v Not surprisingly, reform enthusiasts
have turned their attention to incremental reforms.99 Given this dynamic,
we believe that incremental reforms are all that is likely to emerge from
the political process during the foreseeable future.99
B. Some Incremental Reforms of Employment-Based Insurance
It is fair to ask what changes, if any, we would make in the
employment-based coverage market. We believe that several important
changes will help ensure the continued smooth functioning of the
employment-based market, while simultaneously addressing some of the
problems identified previously. However, we do not fully agree on all of
the details regarding the specific changes that we believe are appropriate,
and on the degree of enthusiasm we each have for particular proposals.
Also, we hasten to add that our modest "fixes" will not completely solve the
problems identified previously, and they will create new problems of their
own-but, as noted previously, the right question is whether, on balance,
these "fixes" make things better when assessed across all the relevant
parameters. We suggest three specific reforms: (1) changing the tax
subsidy so that those without access to employment-based insurance can
enter the coverage marketplace on more equal footing than is currently
the case; (2) amending ERISA to create more sensible state and federal
regulatory and liability regimes; and (3) encouraging the use of
purchasing pools.
1. Tax Subsidy Reform. There are a wide variety of ways in which the
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tax subsidy can be fixed, depending on what one wants to accomplish, and
how much one wants to spend.'00 Most proposals start with providing tax
credits to workers who currently do not have employment-based coverage.
Other proposals include the self-employed or everyone who might want to
purchase private insurance. Depending on the specifics, such
arrangements can effectively create a partial voucher system for the
purchase of health care coverage, and eliminate the horizontal and vertical
inequities associated with the current system.1°  However, the more
extensive the tax credits, the greater the potential for adverse selection, as
younger and healthier employees can suddenly exit existing risk pools.
Therefore, we suggest that tax credit proposals should initially focus on
those who do not currently have access to employment-based coverage.
Beyond that group, we believe that such reforms should be implemented
gradually, in order to evaluate the effect on existing risk pools. The
advantage of this approach is that it provides a market test of the
comparative advantage (if any) of employers in structuring and
administering the coverage market, while simultaneously addressing the
problem of the uninsured.
2. ERISA Reform. Our second, not-so-minor, repair is to amend
ERISA, with due care for the competing considerations of federalism, the
varying need for regulatory oversight of different parts of the employment-
based coverage market, and the issue of managed care liability. This
subject is far too complicated for us to address in this limited space, and we
do not fully agree on the specifics of this "repair." However, we do agree
on several basic principles:
a. Existing law treats coverage quite differently, depending on whether it is
individual, employer-purchased, employer-selffunded, or sponsored by a religious or
governmental employer. Such divisions are wholly artificial, and create
distorting incentives in the coverage market. The choice between state and
federal regulation should not turn on such fortuities and quirks.
Accordingly, the regulatory framework should be revised to treat "like"
coverage alike, irrespective of the context through which it is secured.
b. States should have greater leeway to regulate employment-based health
insurance, with a continuing role for federal oversight. State authority makes
sense where the issues and solutions are likely to vary regionally, along with
social and economic conditions. Experimentation and competition among
state regulatory regimes is also beneficial in its own right, for the familiar
reasons captured in the slogan "laboratory of the states."0 2 On the other
hand, many important innovations in coverage and delivery arrangements
likely would not have occurred without the "breathing room" created by
ERISA preemption. 0 3 Also, national uniformity is sometimes highly
11:l1 (200 1)
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desirable, and some forms of state regulation will undoubtedly be unwise
and unduly burdensome. In keeping with these considerations, federal
preemption should occur on a more targeted basis, instead of being
sweeping and presumptive.
c. Health insurers should not be virtually immune from certain forms of
liability because of the accident of ERISA preemption. A liability scheme should
be devised that sets sensible default rules for allocating responsibility for
medical error throughout the various components of managed health care
systems, but that leaves the parties (e.g., providers, payors, and subscribers)
free to reallocate this responsibility by contract. One of these default rules
is that employers should not be subject to managed care liability solely by
virtue of their role in selecting, designing, or paying for health insurance.
3. Purchasing Cooperatives. Finally, we suggest that purchasing
cooperatives or associations be made more widely available to individuals
and employers. In order for this to occur, the complex and obscure
regulatory treatment of these association pools should be clarified and
streamlined, especially when they cross product and geographic market
boundaries. More specifically, federal or uniform state law should more
clearly define whether insurance sold through pooled arrangements is
treated as individual or group insurance. If it is treated as group insurance,
then the law should define whether it is small or large group insurance,
and, if the latter, the law should delineate the appropriate type for
oversight of self-insured arrangements. To avoid disrupting existing
employment-based markets, care must be taken to prevent purchasing
pools from being used as vehicles for risk selection. Options for addressing
this problem include requiring that subscribers make longer-term
commitments to association pools, or limiting the circumstances under
which subscribers can join or change these pools (e.g., only every three
years, or upon changing jobs or moving to a new area).
C. Whither the Uninsured?
What then of those who are left out of the employment-based system?
Critics of employment-based coverage typically treat the existence of the
uninsured as a moral trump card, justifying immediate and comprehensive
reform regardless of the social and economic costs. We agree that
addressing the problem of the uninsured is an appropriate reform
objective, and we have proposed the use of tax credits to address the
problem. However, we believe that the relationship between the
employment-based coverage market and the uninsured cannot be resolved
on the basis of moralizing. Employers provide coverage (or fail to do so)
out of self-interest, and employees accept or decline coverage after making
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a similar assessment. Employers operate in a competitive labor market-
and they are no more morally blameworthy for failing to offer insurance to
their employees than they are blameworthy for not paying their minimum
wage employees more than minimum wage. Similarly, employees who
decline to accept coverage either assess their risks differently, or simply
have a better use for their money than buying coverage. 4 There is no
compelling theoretical or practical reason to treat all of these decisions,
which occur in the shadow of a competitive labor market, as a failure of
employers or of the employment-based coverage market.
The availability of employment-based pooling mechanisms may (or
may not) offer the best opportunity to address various social problems, but
this possibility should not be viewed as creating a moral obligation on the
part of employers to meet the social needs that our society has proven
unwilling to address, despite repeated opportunities to do so. As Professor
Mark Pauly observed:
[T]he worsening of the lot of the uninsured under market competition,
if it occurs and is not offset by government, would not be an example of
market failure. Rather, it would be an example of serious 'government
failure' (at least in the sense of citizens collectively making a bad
decision), an example of political failure, and perhaps of moral failure.
Markets would be doing what they do best. It would be government that
would be failing to do what it should do. Market competition will have
abolished a type of charity that citizens, when faced with the challenge to




It is not all that hard to envision reforms that, had they been adopted
much earlier, might well have turned out to be superior to the status quo.
Unfortunately, the transition costs and social dislocations in discarding the
existing system are likely to be enormous. 6 It may appear intellectually
unsatisfying to settle for an imperfect institutional arrangement simply
because it happens to be the one in place-particularly when the current
system arose largely by accident. However, the history of attempts at
national health insurance reform is an unhappy one, and human beings
107
appear to be psychologically hard wired to prefer the status quo.
More importantly, any significant change in the existing framework is
likely to prompt massive adjustments. Employers are already exceedingly
skittish about their role in the coverage market, and they can only be
pushed so far. Consider the impact of Financial Accounting Standard 106,
an accounting ruling effective in 1993 that required employers to carry as a
11:l1(2001)
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current liability on their balance sheets their promises of future health
benefits for retirees. This relatively minor change prompted some
employers to drop retiree health benefits altogether and many more to
scale back the extent of those benefits.108
The debate about the competing patient bills of rights reflects similar
concerns. A major concern in the debate is whether increasing employers'
risk of managed care liability will prompt them to drop coverage
altogether.'0 9 Most of the competing bills have strong language intended to
allay this concern, reflecting that the risk is taken seriously on both sides of
the political spectrum. We should expect widespread disruptions-both
intended and unintended-when wholesale reform of the employment-
based system is undertaken.
On balance, the existing system, as imperfect as it is, may be the best
we can do under the circumstances. One good indicator of this is that,
when asked, most employees would prefer that their employers continue
their role in selecting health insurance. " " This does not mean that the
employment-based market cannot be improved through judicious
market-enhancing initiatives. Yet, the truth of the matter is that an
employment-based coverage market does have real strengths, even in its
current form, and the proposed "reforms" have their own weaknesses,
which any rigorous assessment of the alternatives must weigh in the
balance. The fact that the existing system delivers a range of coverage and
delivery options to 177 million Americans is itself a strong point in its
favor, even without factoring in the transition costs to the brave new world
offered by reform advocates.
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